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Abstract
We revisit experimental data from an online cultural market in which 14,000 users interact to download songs, and develop
a simple model that can explain seemingly complex outcomes. Our results suggest that individual behavior is characterized
by a two-step process–the decision to sample and the decision to download a song. Contrary to conventional wisdom,
social influence is material to the first step only. The model also identifies the role of placement in mediating social signals,
and suggests that in this market with anonymous feedback cues, social influence serves an informational rather than
normative role.
Citation: Krumme C, Cebrian M, Pickard G, Pentland S (2012) Quantifying Social Influence in an Online Cultural Market. PLoS ONE 7(5): e33785. doi:10.1371/
journal.pone.0033785
Editor: Juan A. An˜el, University of Oxford, United Kingdom
Received July 31, 2010; Accepted February 17, 2012; Published May 9, 2012
This is an open-access article, free of all copyright, and may be freely reproduced, distributed, transmitted, modified, built upon, or otherwise used by anyone for
any lawful purpose. The work is made available under the Creative Commons CC0 public domain dedication.
Funding: This work was sponsored by the Department of the Air Force under contract FA8721-05-C-0002. Opinions, interpretations, conclusions, and
recommendations are those of the authors and are not necessarily endorsed by the United States Government. The funders had no role in study design, data
collection and analysis, decision to publish, or preparation of the manuscript.
Competing Interests: The authors have declared that no competing interests exist.
* E-mail: kak@mit.edu
Introduction
Predicting the next blockbuster movie can be good sport. But
it’s hardly science: sleeper films can unexpectedly work their way
to the top, and books ignored by critics suddenly reach best-seller
status [1]. In spite of post-hoc claims that word-of-mouth
marketing or classic positioning ‘‘made’’ a given product,
predicting the success of songs, books, and movies remains largely
a voodoo science [2].
A recent experimental study [3] found that the addition of social
influence to a cultural market increased the unpredictability as
well as the inequality of the market share of individual products.
However, the study did not propose a model to describe how such
social forces might operate. Here, we present a parsimonious
model that sheds light on social behavior in this market. Our
model does not rely on assumptions about heterogeneous
preferences [4] or solely on the generic notion of herd behavior
[5] to explain the outcomes of anonymous social influence: rather,
we treat social influence as a variable whose effect grows as the
market matures.
MusicLab is an online laboratory created in 2004 to evaluate
experimentally the role of social influence in the success of cultural
products. Researchers invited consumers (about 14,000 in total) to
sample 48 previously unknown pop songs via a website, to rate
them, and to download whichever of the songs they liked. Songs
were arranged on the screen in either a 1663 grid (Experiment 1)
or a single column (Experiment 2).
In each experiment, each visitor was assigned randomly to one
of two conditions. In the social influence condition, of which there
were eight instances or ‘‘worlds’’, participants received additional
information about the number of times each song had been
downloaded by his peers, and songs in Experiment 2 were ordered
on the screen according to past download count. Songs were
shown in random order in the independent condition [1,6,7].
Results from the MusicLab experiments suggest that, in this
market, information about the behavior of others contributes to
greater inequality (differential market share) and unpredictability
(variance of possible outcomes), compared to the inequality and
unpredictability in the non-social condition.
While Salganik et al. report empirical findings, they do not
describe a mechanism for the process of social influence. Others
have subsequently proposed theoretical models to explain how a
set of individual preferences and responses can create such
outcomes. Borghesi and Bouchard model each participant’s
decision as a multiple-choice situation, and two conditions of
‘‘weak’’ and ‘‘strong’’ herding that fit the empirical data [8].
Hendricks et al develop an equilibrium model to explain how an
‘‘anonymous’’ non-differentiated herd affects low versus high
quality products [9]. Our approach differs in several regards. First,
we observe the progression of inequality and unpredictability over
the course of each experiment, and to compare it to simulation
results. Unlike Borghesi and Bouchard, we do not consider
decision-making a multiple-choice situation: we model indepen-
dent listens rather than listeners, where a listen occurs according to
a by-song probability derived from its appeal and a coefficient for
social forces.
Social influence exists in non-experimental markets as well, in
the form of herding and informational cascades [5] as well as
individual decision-making in the presence of complex information
[10,11]. Of course, real markets offer a host of complexities
intentionally omitted from the MusicLab experiment in order to
test the researchers’ hypothesis, such as the possibility for stronger,
peer-to-peer social influence and external marketing forces
[12,13]. We discuss below some of the ways in which the
experimental setting both resembles and differs from real-world
markets. Here, our focus is on parsimoniously modeling the social
dynamics of the MusicLab marketplace itself.
To do so, we develop a model for the empirical results that
distinguishes between a song’s quality and the signal generated by
the visible downloads. From the empirical data, we observe that
song selection can be modeled as a sequential process in which
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each song has a probability of being sampled, independent of the
other songs a listener chooses, and then an independent
probability of being downloaded. Modeling choices are based on
empirical observations of user behavior in this market. We
describe this process and the model inputs in detail in the following
sections.
Results
In the MusicLab experiment, the authors record the choices of
participants who enter the market one-by-one. Here, we model
song listens rather than market participants, and validate this
approximation by examining the consistency of sampling across
different participants’ propensity to sample more or fewer songs.
We find that people who listen to a total of n (where n,40) songs
in the system have, on average, the same probability of sampling a
particular song i. In fact, over the entire population, the probability
song i will be sampled does not depend on the distribution of volume of
listens in the population who samples it (r-squared = 0.1, Figure
S1]. Additionally, the conditional probability of downloading a
song (given it was sampled) does not depend on the total number
of songs a participant samples [Figure S2, Figure S3].
Again from the empirical data, we observe that there are two
stages of decision-making, listening and downloading, that occur
according to fixed but independent distributions. The result of the
second step (downloading), but not the first (listening), is ultimately
visible to future market entrants. We observe that the probability
that a user clicks on a song (which we ascribe to the appeal of the
song’s title) is independent of the conditional probability he
downloads the same song, given he listened to it (which we call the
song’s quality) [Figure 1]. This finding suggests that in this market,
the perception of quality is not subject to social influence.
Sociologists distinguish between the normative and informa-
tional facets of social influence [14]: while the former might
compel a person to do as others do, the latter acts as a signal of
what others like. Because song appeal and propensity to download
are independent, we assert that social influence works as a purely
informational force in this market (in other markets, of course,
normative influence may be much more relevant).
In both experiments, a song’s appeal depends on two factors:
first, the inherent attractiveness of its title, and second, its
positioning on the screen, which we call availability. Availability is
defined as the probability that a song i will be sampled in a given
position p:
Vi~
X
p
li,pX
i
li,p
We find that in MusicLab, positioning matters [Figure 2]: in
Experiment 2, participants are more likely than random to click on
songs at the top of the list than on those mid-way down. In
Experiment 1, the grid interface, the general trend is the same,
with a small spike in multiples of three, representing songs
positioned on the left side of the screen.
A song’s appeal reflects the probability that a participant will
want to sample or try it. We can think of appeal as a function of
the final listen counts in the independent condition, where:
Ai~li=
X
k
lk
for k= songs 1 through 48. Here, appeal simply represents the
probability of sampling a song, due the attractiveness of the song
title in each of the social worlds.
Quality, in turns, measures the conditional probability of
download, which we derive directly from the independent world
for each of Experiments 1 and 2:
qi~Di=li
Finally, we find the total run length of each experimental world, as
well as the total download count, which round to an average of
2700 listens in Experiment 1, 2500 listens in Experiment 2, and
1000 downloads in the social conditions of both experiments (with
slightly higher variance in total downloads across the eight worlds
of Experiment 1).
Model Description: Po´lya Urn
Using these inputs, we model the dynamic download count Di of
each song i over time, and use the final download counts to
compute inequality and unpredictability. The model consists of
two steps for each entrance of a listener to the market [Figure 3].
These steps are repeated if a listener elects to try more than one
song:
1. Select a song to sample, based on its appeal, position, and
current download count
2. Choose whether or not to download the song, based on its
quality
In the first step, a participant enters the market and chooses a
song at random to sample based on a combination of its appeal Ai
the availability score of its current position Vi,t, and its current
download count Di,t.
The probability that song i is sampled is
Vi,t(Di,tzaAi)X
j
Vj,t(Dj,tzaAj)
:
Here is a scaling factor, constant across all songs, which captures
the strength of the social signal. As Di grows over the course of the
experiment, its value contributes increasingly to the probability a
song will be sampled.
In the second step, the user downloads the chosen song with
probability qi, and Di is incremented if a download occurs.
While we model listens rather than individuals with different
listener types, this assumption has little effect on model outcomes
[Figure S2]. In other words, our model can be said to describe one
listener at a time, who listens to at least one song, after which he
Figure 1. Quality and appeal are independent. Values are shown
for quality and appeal corresponding to the 48 songs in Experiment 2,
independent condition. R2 = 0.012.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0033785.g001
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can choose to repeat these steps, up to a total of 48 times, or to exit
the market by not selecting a song.
The decision to listen to a song leaves no signal for others: a
song’s listen count is invisible to other participants. By contrast,
download count is seen by users in the social influence condition
(but not by those in the independent condition). So, a user arriving
late to the market with social signal receives more information
Figure 2. Availability in the independent world of Experiments 1 (A, top) and 2 (B, bottom), indexed to 1. The availability of a position n
describes the likelihood that a song in that position will be sampled (where n = 1 is the top left corner in Experiment 1, and the topmost position in
Experiment 2, and n=48 is the bottom right corner in Experiment 1 and the bottom of the column in Experiment 2). Availability serves as a multiplier
in calculating the total probability of a song being sampled, given its position-independent appeal, and its position at a given time in the market. In
Experiment 1 (Figure 2a), songs on the left side of the grid are more likely to be sampled, all else equal, than songs on the right. In Experiment 2
(Figure 2b), songs at the top of the column, as well as the final song, are more likely to be sampled.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0033785.g002
Figure 3. Song selection as a two-step process. A listen first selects which song(s) he will listen to, and after listening, decides whether or not to
download the song. The first decision is made based on the appeal of a song; the second based on its quality. If a listener listens to more than one
song, this process is repeated.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0033785.g003
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about the songs chosen for download by his peers than does an
earlier entrant.
Inequality and Unpredictability
In the original experiment, inequality is defined by the Gini
coefficient,
I~
XS
i~1
XS
j~1
Di{Dj
 
2S
XS
i~1
Di
where Di is the final download count, or market share, of song i,
and S the total number of songs.
Unpredictability is measured across multiple worlds, with the
unpredictability for song i
ui~
XW
j~1
XW
k~jz1
mi,j{mi,k
  W
2
 
where mi,j is the market share of song i in world j and total
unpredictability U~
XS
j~1
uj=S
Using the sets of inputs for Experiments 1 and 2, we simulate
eight social influence worlds of 2700 listens in Experiment 1, and
2500 listens in Experiment 2 (with resulting download counts
ranging from 900–1100) and compute the resulting inequality and
unpredictability. To calculate these values for the independent
conditions, we run the simulation without the effect of the visibly
increasing download count (and its concomitant social effects), so
that the probability of sampling song i is simply
Vi,tAiX
j
Vj,tAj
For each experiment, we find, through simulation, the value of
alpha that offers the best fit for the values of unpredictability and
inequality observed in the original experiment [Table 1]. We are
able to replicate the values of inequality and unpredictability over
the course of both experiments [Figure 4, Figure 5, Figure S4].
We observe a substantially higher alpha in Experiment 1 (songs
displayed in a grid) versus Experiment 2 (songs displayed in a
column), suggesting that the impact of a song’s appeal is more
important in the early stages of the market of Experiment 1. This
could be due to the fact that all songs are visible on a single grid,
and there is no need to scroll down a long list: a listener employs
social information differently to make his choice, compared to the
column layout of Experiment 2.
With a frugal model that parallels the decision-making process
of the listener (who elects to sample a song based on its inherent
appeal, its screen position, and how many others have downloaded
it; then decides whether to download it based on its quality), we
are able to reproduce the results of the original Experiment 2 with
RMSE=0.0012 for unpredictability and 0.0516 for inequality
over the course of the market, and for Experiment 1,
RMSE=0.0017 for unpredictability and 0.093 for inequality.
To summarize the findings described thus far, we first
determined, from the experimental data, that the perception of
quality, which drives the propensity to download, is not influenced
by social forces in this market. Second, with a single scaling factor,
we were able to simulate results for inequality and unpredictability
over the course of the experiment, suggesting that the dynamics of
the market are one of an increasing impact of social factors as the
experiment progresses. That is, over time, the weight of the
download count grows relative to the appeal of songs in
determining a listener’s choice of music to sample. Finally, the
positioning of songs has an impact, and in particular the screen
layouts of Experiments 1 and 2 yield different scaling factors,
suggesting that the way in which products are positioned impacts
the magnitude of the social forces.
Long-run Dynamics
In the short run, sampling in the MusicLab market is based
largely on initial screen position and on the appeal of songs’ titles.
In the longer run, in our model the download to listen ratio
increases, suggesting that a larger proportion of higher quality
songs are being sampled. Simulating 100,000 listens, the download
count to listen count ratio rises significantly, to about 51
downloads per 100 listens in Experiment 2 (in the typical 2500-
listen world, this ratio hovers around 39 downloads per listen).
Because the number of listens is fixed in the simulation, the higher
ratio indicates that a greater number of songs are being
downloaded (and that higher quality songs are being sampled
more frequently). Of course, in a real market, users may adjust
their behavior as market conditions change: for example, they may
sample more or fewer songs than earlier entrants.
When social influence is present, unpredictability sinks slightly
(to a mean of .0083 with a standard deviation of .00043 on 100
runs after 100,000 listens in Experiment 2), while Gini rises (to a
mean of 0.69 with standard deviation 0.033). The unpredictability
of the non-social worlds declines significantly (after 100,000 listens
in Experiment 2, it reaches a mean of .00005, or about 1% of its
value at 2500 listens).
Table 1. Values of unpredictability and inequality from
simulated (polya) and original (SDW) markets.
Experiment 1, alpha=900
Polya SDW
Inequality (mean) 0.4 0.35
Inequality NS 0.28 0.25
Unpredictability 0.0072 0.008
Unpredictability NS 0.0053 0.005**
Experiment 2, alpha=200
Inequality (mean) 0.52 0.51
Inequality NS 0.22 0.2
Unpredictability 0.012 0.0127
Unpredictability NS 0.005 0.004**
*NS =non-social
**averaged from sub-populations
The inequality (measured by Gini) is a mean of the results of 8 worlds. In the
original experiments, the value for non-social unpredictability was determined
by taking subpopulation of the independent condition. The simulated value for
unpredictability is determined from 8 simulated non-social worlds.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0033785.t001
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Markets with Social Influence
Of course, real markets differ from the MusicLab experiment in
several regards. It is unlikely that a real market would reach even
several thousand listens in isolation. Exogenous marketing cues
can push behavior in significant ways, as can the non-indepen-
dence of quality and appeal, such as in the case of disproportionate
advertising resources devoted to books anticipated to have high
quality [2].
Moreover, real markets typically see a greater volume of
products, as well as the dynamic entry of new products to the
system. A person cannot view every film or read every book
published (nor, in many cases, does he have the chance to sample
such products before buying), so he relies to some extent on social
signals as filters. It is likely that these real-world cues are a mixture
of informational (‘‘all of colleagues have read it, so I should give it
a try’’) and normative (‘‘my best friend recommends it, so I should
read it to be able to discus with her’’). Normative information is
further strengthened by the presence of real relationships [15],
versus the simple download counts that stand in for social signals
in the MusicLab marketplace.
Yet in a number of markets, such as online retail of goods in the
‘‘long tail’’, marketing plays a lesser role [16], and the actions of
buyers can influence how the seller promotes his products, and thus
how future entrants make their decisions. In the MusicLab
experiment, we are able to observe the outcomes created by social
feedback and incremented downloads alone. In the presence of
social-based sorting, the outcome of themarket becomes less certain.
Discussion
Our model is able to account for the empirical outcomes of the
MusicLab experiment given market size, distribution of appeal,
availability and quality, and strength of the social signal. Future
work might build on these results, by extending such a model to
include the dynamic entry of songs to the market, non-
homogenous listeners (e.g. agents with different preferences over
genres), and variants on the social signal.
Although the market in question was created for the purpose of
experimentation, it represents thousands of real people expressing
live preferences about songs. Such controlled web-based experi-
ments can offer insight into how social forces impact markets.
Here, we develop a parsimonious model that explains observed
data, and show that social influence serves a largely informational
role in the present market. The behavior of others impacts what an
individual will try, but has only indirect effect on what he buys.
Figure 4. Inequality (top) and unpredictability (bottom) over
the course of the market, with alpha=900. Inequality is shown for
Experiment 1, world 3. RMSE of simulated market’s unpredictability
is = 0.0017, and average of inequality is = 0.093.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0033785.g004
Figure 5. Inequality (top) and unpredictability (bottom) over
the course of the market, with alpha=200. Inequality is shown for
Experiment 2, world 5. RMSE of simulated market’s unpredictability
is = 0.0012, and average of inequality is = 0.0516.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0033785.g005
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Finally, we argue that the missing link in previous analysis of this
data is the effect of availability: aggregate opinion is important
insofar as it helps to modulate the salience of a song to new users
entering the system. Product positioning and social media are
often considered separately in marketing strategy: in this market,
the two are closely linked. After all, if we’re to believe Woody
Allen, 80% of success is showing up.
Supporting Information
Figure S1 In our model, we consider song listens rather
than individual listeners. We validate this approximation by
examining the consistency of sampling across different participants
types, where a user’s type is defined by his propensity to samplemore
or fewer songs. We find that users who listen to a total of n (where
n,40) songs in the system have, on average, the same probability of
sampling a particular song i. In other words, over the entire
population, the probability song i will be sampled does not depend on the
distribution of volume of listens in the population who samples it. Figure
S1 shows, for each listener type on the vertical axis, the total
distribution of songs sampled by listeners of that type in the
independent condition (here, Experiment 2), ranging from blue
(min) to red (max). The y-axis describes listener types: with each row
representing a type, from users who listened to a single song at the
top to those who elected all 48 at the bottom. The x-axis represents
the 48 distinct songs, organized alphanumerically as in the original
experiment (see 2006 paper for song names), from left to right. No
listener listened to precisely 32, 34, or between 39–41 songs, and
listeners who listened to 48 songs (clearly) sampled every song.
Listeners of different types spread their listens between songs
approximately evenly (ANOVA p ,, 0.01).
(TIFF)
Figure S2 The conditional probability of downloading a
song (given it was sampled) does not depend on the total
number of songs a participant samples. Figure S2 shows
the average conditional probability of download versus listener
type.
(TIFF)
Figure S3 Listener type on the vertical axis, versus
conditional probability of download.
(TIFF)
Figure S4 Inequality results in each of the 8 worlds of
Experiments 1 and 2.
(TIFF)
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